

3 FEB 1975

DCI/IC 75-001

Lieutenant General Daniel O. Graham, USA
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20301

Dear Dan:

This letter follows up on one of our conversations while we were visiting Forts Leavenworth and Sill last week--subject: "Intelligence Support for Service School Instruction on Soviet Tactical Doctrine."

My basic letter to Phil Davidson of 14 September 1971 (enclosed) is probably still as valid as when it was written. The point is that the young Infantry or Armored School instructor musing his way through a Soviet military book stall would know what he was looking for. The same individual in a cocktail conversation in Moscow with a senior Soviet officer would know what questions he would like to ask. In either instance, our attaches don't know.

While I am addressing only part of the problem here, it seems to me that this is a situation which is easily correctable and at relatively low cost. And Bill DePuy would bless us for doing so.

I am more than ready to help any way I can.

Sincerely,

/s/ Samuel V. Wilson
Samuel V. Wilson
Lieutenant General, USA
Deputy to the DCI for the
Intelligence Community

Enclosures:
5 letters

cc: DDCI

Orig - addressee 1 - D/DCI/IC chrono
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EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
DEFENSE ATTACHE OFFICE
Moscow, USSR

14 September 1971

Major General Phillip B. Davidson, Jr., USA
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Department of the Army
Washington, DC 20310

Dear General Davidson:

This letter marks a kind of surfacing for air after my first three months on station. Unfortunately it may be somewhat vague in certain areas since, as you will recognize, much of the current information necessary for a thorough analysis of my role here in contributing to the fund of required knowledge on the Soviet Union is not available at this end. Therefore, what I am providing is essentially only an educated point of view with some preliminary suggestions. If I am wrong, then the experts and you -- my superiors -- can tell me so. On the other hand, if I am right in what I am saying, then the same people can pick up the problem and start doing something about it.

The subject of this letter concerns our present state of knowledge, or lack thereof, of Soviet Ground Forces tactical doctrine and those measures we might consider to improve this situation. I would submit that the average tactical commander in the US Army (company to division level) does not know what he should about the Soviet Army, how it is organized, armed, equipped, supported, trained, led and fought. And few major commanders (with the possible exception of CINCUSAREUR/Seventh Army) are ensuring that their subordinate commanders are being educated and trained in this subject area. Material put out on this subject at our major combat arms schools -- Benning, Knox and Sill -- is spotty, superficial and outdated; Leavenworth teaches little in this area (or taught little in the past); and, the senior service colleges generally neglect the subject (at least it has been my experience that this is so).

Obviously, there are a number of reasons for the existing state of affairs, assuming my basic thesis is correct in the first place. I would note our intense preoccupation with Viet-Nam, the very real difficulties in obtaining up-to-date intelligence on the Soviet Armed Forces, our extensive concern in today's Army with being able to man

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and train deployable units -- to name a few. In this connection, I want on no account to give the impression of levelling the finger and saying "I accuse!" I might point out that my last three assignments, in order, were 6th Special Forces Group Commander, Assistant Commandant, USAJFKMIA, and ADC-Operations, 82d Airborne Division. So, if we were to talk about guilt, I am as guilty as anyone else, because I also did very little about the problem under discussion. But such is not the point. The point is - what can and should be done about it?

Now, there is certainly nothing novel or new in this thesis, nor am I in any sense the first to raise it. It has come up a number of times before, and there are people who have tried -- and still are trying -- to do something about it. For example, years ago (October 1951, to be exact), the then AC of S, G-2/DA Major General Alex Bolling, Sr., approved the establishment of a small group of highly qualified ex-Soviet officers in the old Post Office Building in downtown Washington to act as consultants to the US Army on questions pertaining to the Soviet military establishment. This group enjoyed its greatest productivity during the tenure of another of your illustrious predecessors, Major General John Williams, who placed a high priority on the development and publication of a series of handbooks on the Soviet Armed Forces. It is my impression that these handbooks, developed with the help of these ex-Soviet officers, were quite well received throughout the Army. As you may know, this group is still in existence in DIA (called, I believe, the "Handbook and Analysis Group"), but its value has been diminished through the death of its original members and their substitution with lower ranking, less qualified ex-Soviet and East European military personnel who fled to the west in the 1950's and 1960's.

Another breakthrough in this problem area occurred in the Spring of 1953, with the visit to the States of the Yugoslav Deputy Chief of Staff for training, the late LTCOL General Dusan Kveder. General Kveder, a post-war graduate of the Voroshilov General Staff Academy in Moscow, visited and lectured at all of our major service schools and colleges during his stay in the US and subsequently left behind his lecture notes and slides for our use. But, this was 1953.

I am also aware of the fact that there are small staff sections, on the Army Staff, in DIA and in the service school system, which continue to grapple with this subject. My basic question is - does their work enjoy the priority it should? And, more specifically, is USDAO/Moscow doing what it should to support them?

As seen by your Army Attache in Moscow, part of the problem lies in our intelligence collection priorities, with little or almost no priority indicated for collection effort in the area of Soviet Ground Forces tactical doctrine. And this, in my judgement, is a problem for the long to resolve, not for now. For example, of the 174 active SIC's currently on hand here, 111 are essentially requirements for Order of

little information. There are 410 so-called Geographic SICR's. This means that some of the OR SICR's are cross-referenced as Geographic SICR's also, lest one think we are counting a given SICR twice. (By our definition, Geographic SICR's are those which pertain to specific geographic areas within the USSR. They frequently include sub-requirements on OR, scientific-technical, industrial, urban-governmental and medical subjects.) Further, there are 67 SICR's, which are exclusively scientific-technical in nature and 12 SICR's of a miscellaneous variety. Of these latter 12, only 4 relate to Soviet tactical doctrine - at least in part - in that they concern current Soviet maneuver/exercise activities and/or contain sub-questions relating to tactical employment of major weapons systems. I would emphasize, however, that there are no - repeat no SICR's which focus directly and exclusively on Soviet tactical or strategic doctrine. This, in my opinion, represents an imbalance in our overall collection effort.

To be sure, the Defense Intelligence Requirements Manual (DIRM) includes a section on Soviet tactics, but it is a kind of encyclopaedia where virtually every subject of possible intelligence interest is listed. What should be understood is that, to a significant degree, the SICR's and their respective priorities tend to play the governing role in what we do and don't do here. For one thing, a 1-R SICR tells us clearly that we have a hot customer back home who is going to do something with what we pick up in response to his request. On the other hand, the absence of any explicit SICR's on Soviet tactics would suggest that there are no real customers for such a collection effort, and I have a hard time accepting this as being valid.

We should note another basic consideration at this juncture. It pertains to the overall collection environment in the Soviet Union. Not only are we faced with severe restrictions placed on our activities by Soviet authorities, but - given the present US administration's attitude toward negotiations and even to the possibility of detente between the US and the USSR, our inferred operational guidelines are to maintain a low silhouette in our collection activities, to avoid possible confrontations and incidents as counter-productive to efforts currently underway in the political field. This we are trying very hard to do and -- whether it is pure coincidence or not -- we have the impression that a slight thaw has occurred in our local relations with Soviet military figures. (I should note that this minor trend, and I hesitate to call it that, pre-dates my own arrival on station.) All of this means to us that an attache lurking in the vicinity of a missile site with a camera in his hand is out of step with the times, while the same officer browsing through Soviet military literature in a book store is not. Furthermore, the latter individual - if he reads and understands

(A SICR No.'s D-322-49021; E-410-15415/NSC//; D-37X-49029; G-MID-25657)

what he picks up - can have something substantive and relatively non-controversial to discuss the next time he clinks a glass with a Soviet officer at a Moscow reception. And it has been my experience, as well as that of my senior colleagues here, that Soviet officers on occasion will discuss tactical subjects with some freedom. But weapons systems? Never. (Please see the attachment to this letter for some sample ideas of what we can do more of on the Moscow scene.)

This does not mean that this DAO is in a position now -- or ever shall be -- to provide Washington with reams of reports on Soviet Ground Forces tactical doctrine and related subjects. We have never been able to do that consistently on any subject. We can focus here, however, on gaps and voids in our knowledge of Soviet Ground Forces tactical doctrine, which we have not been able to fill by other means. To do this, we need a reasonably clear and definitive statement of what the Army staff needs, with emphasis on those specific questions to which answers are required in the doctrinal area. And that is the real purpose of this letter.

As a related matter, I feel I should call to your attention and that of informational addressees that the former DATT/AIRA, Colonel William F Scott, USAF, (who has remained on station as AIRA since my arrival) has been reporting for some time in the related field of Soviet military strategy and doctrine, the patterns and trends of Soviet strategic thought, Soviet research and analytical procedures in the strategic arena, the roles played by key Soviet military figures as exponents of one or another strategic proposition, etc. That no customer has emerged for this kind of product is rather puzzling to me, but our files here reflect little or no reaction to his efforts except from the Department of State. I am sure Colonel Scott would endeavor to be responsive to specific questions concerning Soviet strategy, as put to him by-say-the people in the DCSOPS plans shop. At the very least, he could come closer than anyone I know in finding the relevant Soviet open-source documents -- if it exists -- on a given strategic subject.

If my long and rambling letter seems presumptuous, please accept the fact that it is not intended to be. It is dedicated to the old adage of knowing who you are. I simply feel we (all of us collectively) are not doing as well in this area as we might, particularly for that young commander in the field, and that we have to try to do better. It occurs to me that this is an area where your personal interest and even intervention may be desirable and profitable.

Very Sincerely,


W. H. WILSON

USA

Attache

cc:
LTC Donald V. Bennett, USA, Director, DIA
LTG Richard G. Stilwell, JCSOPS, DA
MG Lawrence J. Fuller, Deputy Director for Attache Affairs, DIA

Sample Listing of Possible AAW/Moscow Collection Activities on Soviet
Trends in Doctrine.

1. Elicitation - type discussions with Communist Bloc military attaches who have been schooled in Soviet doctrine.
2. Elicitation - type discussions with Bloc attaches on Soviet maneuvers and tactical exercises (See DAO Moscow 1221, DTG 021415, Sep 71, for example.)
3. Reporting on small unit tactics and training observed while travelling (See report on visit to Taman Division on 25 June 1971, IR 6901020371.)
4. Monitoring of Soviet military literature to pick up new trends. (For example, valuable information on Soviet doctrine for employment of heavy transporters - the MAZ-537 - to move tank divisions was contained in an open-source publication which languished in Washington for several months before the Soviets demonstrated this new doctrine in the Czechoslovakian invasion. Publication in question was entitled "Movement of Small Units over Great Distances". One of the present AAWMA's/Moscow was working at that time in the Pentagon and had this publication in his possession.) Type publications which contain articles that could be monitored and flagged for special attention in DIA and ACSI include: "First Sergeant-Sergeant", "Military Knowledge", "Military Herald", "Rear Services and Supply", "The Soviet Warrior", "Communist of the Armed Forces", "Red Star".
5. Discussions of a general nature on Soviet tactical doctrine with Soviet officers on social occasions. (It should be noted that successes in this area are not certain, and will depend upon general political atmosphere, a certain degree of luck, etc.) Type questions might include:
 - a. Role of Soviet airborne division in light of modern air defense developments.
 - b. Soviet concepts of airborne operations.
 - c. Problem of supporting Soviet armored forces, given leanness (?) of their logistical support units.
 - d. Problems of tank armies really occupying and holding terrain which has been taken in a blitzkrieg type operation.
 - e. Question whether shock effect of tank units is still as effective as in World War II, given existence of modern anti-tank weapons and better psychological preparation of soldiers to deal with tanks.
 - f. Validity of fortified defensive barriers in modern warfare.

g. "Leading" question: Are not Soviets still, in essence, fighting World War II rather than coming up with new tactical doctrine?

h. Problem in Soviet Army of functioning effectively with so few professional NCO's.

i. Soviet problem of handling communication's in a war of maneuver where tank commanders are still using flag signals.

NOTE: In reality, these may not be the most important questions. Hence, the need for guidance.

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

DAMI-ZC

26 OCT 1971

Brigadier General Samuel V. Wilson
Defense Attache
Defense Attache Office
Embassy of the United States of America
Moscow, USSR

Dear General Wilson:

The suggestions in your letter of 14 September have been reviewed with interest here in OACSI. They relate to an on-going OACSI effort to identify intelligence production gaps of particular interest to the Army. Current and detailed knowledge of Soviet tactical doctrine, as well as Soviet capabilities for mobilization, reinforcement and sustained combat, are the major gaps. Extant collection systems are not providing this information. However, the lack of information on doctrine is apparently not a matter of priorities. The latest draft DCID 1/2, "U.S. Intelligence Objectives and Priorities," lists two objectives for Soviet military doctrine; one under nuclear war conditions with a Priority One, and the other under non-nuclear conditions a Priority Two. The scale of priorities is one through eight.

As to the Army Staff needs, each year we solicit their intelligence production requirements and those of selected Army commands. These requirements are analyzed in OACSI and levied on the responsible production agency. DIA is the responsible agency for Soviet Ground Force doctrine. The annual solicitation does surface requests for doctrinal items. For example, this year we have requests for trends in Warsaw Pact doctrine for the employment of armor and for information about Soviet cover and deception doctrine on the battlefield. In the event that information is not available in the producing agency that agency develops a SICR and levies it on likely collection sources. In the case of doctrine, DIA also has the responsibility for developing the SICR.

I share your concern over the lack of knowledge of tactical commanders about the Soviet Army. Part of that shortcoming can be attributed to the paucity of information. Another reason, and probably the primary

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DAMI-ZC

Brigadier General Samuel V. Wilson

one, is the instruction provided at our schools and command emphasis after schooling has been completed. I am examining the adequacy of the training provided at the Army Intelligence School and the intelligence instruction provided at other Army schools. A major task currently under study is the reorientation of our instruction from a relatively low-intensity conflict in Southeast Asia to a high-intensity one in Europe. Information on Soviet tactical doctrine is becoming more important as this shift occurs.

I appreciate your thoughtful suggestions and welcome any others you may have in the future.

Sincerely,



PHILLIP B. DAVIDSON, JR.

Major General, GS

ACofS for Intelligence

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DEFENSE ATTACHE OFFICE
Moscow, USSR

14 September 1971

Mr Lawrence J. Fuller, USA
Deputy Director for Attache Affairs
Defense Intelligence Agency
Washington, DC 20301

Dear General Fuller:

More and more I am regretting that I did not get to see you prior to my departure from Washington. One way or the other, I hope that this will be corrected before this tour is over, perhaps by your paying us a visit in Moscow.

I believe the enclosed correspondence tells its own story. This is something I feel rather strongly about, and I am hoping for your support.

My best wishes for your success and professional satisfaction in your present assignment. We need you.

Sincerely,

Samuel V. Wilson

SAMUEL V. WILSON
BG, USA
Defense Attache

Encl:

Copy of letter to
MG Davidson, ACSI, DM, with
copy of cover letter to
LTC Bennett

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DEFENSE ATTACHE OFFICE
Moscow, USSR

14 September 1971

LTC Donald V. Bennett
Director
Defense Intelligence Agency
Washington, DC 20301

Dear General Bennett:

As you will see from the enclosed letter to MG Phil Davidson, I'm trying to get something started on Soviet tactical doctrine. To me, this falls smack in the Army's lap, not in yours.

If I'm stepping on anybody's toes (and I'm trying hard not to), I'll go stand in your furthest corner until you tell me I can come out.

Separately, I am trying to pull together a resume of the first three-month's stewardship. You gave me a kind of ultimatum that I should burrow in and hang on for two months and (inferred) cause no major ripples for that period. I have held my breath for three months and now see some things I'd like to do, if they make sense to you.

Warm regards.

Sincerely,

Samuel V. Wilson

SAMUEL V. WILSON
BG, USA
Defense Attache

Encl:
Copy of letter to
MG Davidson, ADI, DA

cc:
Lt. Fuller, Dep Dir for
Attache Affairs

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DEFENSE ATTACHE OFFICE
Moscow, USSR

14 September 1971

LTC Richard G. Stilwell
Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations
Department of the Army
Washington, DC 20310

Dear General Stilwell:


The motive behind the enclosed letter to MG Phil Davidson will be apparent to you immediately.

I only hope I am not getting into trouble by appearing to stir things up with a long-handled spoon (5,000+ miles worth).

If the basic letter makes any sense to you from the military education and training standpoint, then I would like to count on your support.

Warm regards.

Sincerely,



SAMUEL V. WILSON
BG, USA
Defense Attache

Encl:
Copy of letter to
MG Davidson, ACSI, DA